I carried out a static analysis of DeepSeek, a Chinese LLM chatbot, using version 1.8.0 from the Google Play Store. The objective was to identify possible security and privacy problems.

I have actually blogged about DeepSeek formerly here.

Additional security and personal privacy issues about DeepSeek have been raised.

See likewise this analysis by NowSecure of the of DeepSeek

The findings detailed in this report are based purely on static analysis. This indicates that while the code exists within the app, there is no definitive proof that all of it is performed in practice. Nonetheless, the existence of such code warrants scrutiny, especially provided the growing concerns around data privacy, security, bahnreise-wiki.de the potential abuse of AI-driven applications, and cyber-espionage dynamics in between global powers.

Key Findings

Suspicious Data Handling & Exfiltration

- Hardcoded URLs direct data to external servers, raising concerns about user activity tracking, such as to ByteDance "volce.com" endpoints. NowSecure determines these in the iPhone app yesterday also. - Bespoke encryption and information obfuscation approaches exist, with indications that they could be used to exfiltrate user details.

• The app contains hard-coded public keys, rather than relying on the user device's chain of trust.
• UI interaction tracking captures detailed user habits without clear approval.
• WebView manipulation exists, which could permit the app to gain access to personal external internet browser data when links are opened. More details about WebView manipulations is here
  
  Device Fingerprinting & Tracking
  
  A significant part of the evaluated code appears to focus on gathering device-specific details, which can be used for tracking and fingerprinting.
  
  - The app collects different distinct device identifiers, including UDID, Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, and provider details.
• System properties, installed packages, and root detection mechanisms suggest potential anti-tampering measures. E.g. probes for the presence of Magisk, a tool that privacy supporters and security researchers use to root their Android gadgets. - Geolocation and network profiling are present, indicating prospective tracking abilities and enabling or disabling of fingerprinting regimes by region.
• Hardcoded gadget model lists suggest the application might behave differently depending on the detected hardware.
• Multiple vendor-specific services are utilized to extract extra device details. E.g. if it can not figure out the device through basic Android SIM lookup (because permission was not given), it attempts producer particular extensions to access the very same details.
  
  Potential Malware-Like Behavior
  
  While no conclusive conclusions can be drawn without vibrant analysis, several observed habits line up with recognized spyware and malware patterns:
  
  - The app uses reflection and UI overlays, utahsyardsale.com which could assist in unauthorized screen capture or phishing attacks.
• SIM card details, identification numbers, and other device-specific information are aggregated for unknown purposes.
• The app executes country-based gain access to constraints and "risk-device" detection, recommending possible monitoring systems.
• The app carries out calls to fill Dex modules, where extra code is packed from files with a.so extension at runtime.
• The.so submits themselves reverse and make extra calls to dlopen(), which can be used to pack additional.so files. This facility is not generally examined by Google Play Protect and clashofcryptos.trade other fixed analysis services.
• The.so files can be carried out in native code, such as C++. The use of native code adds a layer of intricacy to the analysis process and obscures the full level of the app's abilities. Moreover, native code can be leveraged to more easily intensify privileges, potentially exploiting vulnerabilities within the operating system or gadget hardware.
  
  Remarks
  
  While information collection prevails in contemporary applications for debugging and enhancing user experience, aggressive fingerprinting raises substantial personal privacy concerns. The DeepSeek app requires users to log in with a valid email, which should already supply enough authentication. There is no legitimate reason for the app to aggressively collect and send special device identifiers, passfun.awardspace.us IMEI numbers, SIM card details, and other non-resettable system properties.
  
  The degree of tracking observed here surpasses normal analytics practices, potentially allowing persistent user tracking and re-identification across gadgets. These behaviors, integrated with obfuscation methods and network communication with third-party tracking services, require a higher level of scrutiny from security researchers and users alike.
  
  The employment of runtime code loading as well as the bundling of native code recommends that the app could enable the release and execution of unreviewed, from another location provided code. This is a serious potential attack vector. No proof in this report exists that from another location released code execution is being done, just that the facility for this appears present.
  
  Additionally, the app's technique to detecting rooted gadgets appears excessive for an AI chatbot. Root detection is typically justified in DRM-protected streaming services, where security and content protection are vital, or in competitive computer game to avoid unfaithful. However, drapia.org there is no clear rationale for such stringent measures in an application of this nature, raising further concerns about its intent.
  
  Users and companies thinking about setting up DeepSeek should be conscious of these potential risks. If this application is being utilized within a business or federal government environment, additional vetting and security controls ought to be implemented before enabling its release on handled devices.
  
  Disclaimer: The analysis provided in this report is based upon fixed code review and does not suggest that all discovered functions are actively utilized. Further examination is needed for definitive conclusions.